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Abstract 
Recent research has suggested that deficits in executive control, especially impairments in 
cognitive inhibition, as well as rumination, negative involuntary memories, and reduced 
autobiographical memory specificity could play key roles in the development and exacerbation 
of depressive symptoms. In the present study, participants completed the Negative Affective 
Priming (NAP) task, the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS), the Continuous Word Association 
Task (CWAT), the Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT), and the Center for Epidemiologic 
Studies Depression Scale Revised (CESD-R) to examine the relationship between deficits in 
executive control and dysphoria that may be mediated by ruminative thinking, negative 
involuntary memory retrieval, and autobiographical memory specificity. Executive control 
deficits and greater ruminative tendencies were found in the dysphoric sample relative to 
controls, although there was no evidence to support differences in involuntary memory retrieval 
or memory specificity. Furthermore, rumination, especially brooding rumination, was found to 
mediate the relationship between executive control deficits and dysphoria. Although the NAP 
task seems to measure some aspect of executive control, the results suggested that the task itself 
warrants further scrutiny. 
 Keywords: dysphoria, executive control, rumination, involuntary memory, 
 autobiographical memory specificity    
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The Role of Executive Control Deficits in Cognitive Correlates of Dysphoria  
 Depression is often characterized by abnormal cognitive processes such as increased 
elaboration of negative emotional material and difficulties inhibiting responses to such material 
(Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). This increased focus on negative material often takes the form of 
rumination, wherein individuals focus repetitively on their negative emotional state and its 
potential causes and implications without actively attempting to relieve their distress (Joormann, 
2006). In addition to rumination, depression has been associated with increased negative 
involuntary memory salience and intrusiveness (Newby & Moulds, 2011; Smets, Wessel, 
Schreurs, & Raes, 2012) and with a lessened ability to recall specific autobiographical memories 
when prompted (Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Mackinger, Loschin, & 
Leibetseder, 2000). Evidence has accumulated in recent years that these cognitive phenomena 
are sometimes associated with each other independently of depressive symptomology (e.g., 
Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001), 
which suggests that there may be a common causal mechanism underlying rumination, a reduced 
ability to manage involuntary memories, and diminished autobiographical memory specificity. It 
is plausible that this common mechanism may be some form of impaired cognitive control, such 
as a deficit in cognitive inhibition (see Brewin & Beaton, 2004; Dalgleish et al., 2007; Koster, 
De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). However, as far as I am aware, no study has yet 
sought to explicitly tie these phenomena together through a common cause in inhibitory 
dysfunction in a dysphoric (i.e., subclinically depressed) sample. The current study has two 
goals: firstly, to replicate these cognitive phenomena associated with depression in a dysphoric 
sample, and secondly, to test a mediation model whereby impaired cognitive inhibition 
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contributes to dysphoria indirectly by encouraging or exacerbating rumination, negative 
involuntary memories, and reduced autobiographical memory specificity (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Proposed mediation pathway in which cognitive inhibition deficits contribute to 
dysphoria indirectly by promoting the experience of rumination, negative involuntary memories, 
and less specific autobiographical memories, which in turn leads to depressive symptoms.     
 
Rumination 
 Rumination is often defined as repetitive thinking about the causes, symptoms, meaning, 
and implications of a negative mood state (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
Ruminative responses to negative events and material have been shown to prolong depressive 
episodes (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) and predict depressive disorders, including new onsets of 
depressive episodes (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). People who engage in ruminative responses to 
depressive symptoms have higher levels of depressive symptoms over time, even after 
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accounting for baseline levels of depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). 
Despite the association between depression and rumination, there is evidence to suggest that the 
propensity to engage in rumination is not merely a symptom of depression but rather a stable 
tendency that may increase one’s vulnerability to depression. Roberts, Gilboa, and Gotlib (1998) 
found elevated levels of rumination not only in individuals with current dysphoria, but also in 
individuals with previous depressive episodes compared to individuals who have never been 
depressed, although these individuals did not differ on concurrent depressive symptomology. 
Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) also showed that previously (but not currently) depressed participants 
have scored significantly higher on measures of rumination than never-depressed participants. 
 To account for the etiology of ruminative responses, Koster et al. (2011) proposed the 
“Impaired Disengagement” hypothesis of depressive rumination, whereby prolonged processing 
of negative self-referential material is due in large part to an inability to disengage attention from 
it, rather than, e.g., an attempt to come to a new, helpful insight about one’s current situation. 
Rumination involves automatic as well as controlled processes, and although rumination might 
involve goal-relevant material, the onset of rumination largely occurs automatically (Linville, 
1996), which suggests that engaging in rumination may be the result of a failure to inhibit 
ruminative impulses. 
Inhibition Deficits 
 Inhibitory processes are involved in limiting the access of irrelevant information to 
working memory and are thus important for attention, memory, and engaging in focused, goal-
oriented behavior, which may be impaired in depressed or dysphoric populations. Indeed, 
depression is associated with deficits in cognitive inhibition and executive control more broadly 
(Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Joormann, 2006). In a study by Hertel and Gerstle (2003), dysphoric 
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students exhibited increased recall from sets of words they had practiced suppressing relative to 
controls, demonstrating inhibitory deficits, and the degree of inhibitory dysfunction was 
significantly correlated with self-report measures of depression. Dysphoric participants and 
participants with a history of depressive episodes have exhibited reduced inhibition of negative 
material (Joormann, 2004), which suggests that reduced inhibitory ability can potentially 
function as a stable marker or predictor of depression. Further evidence for a predictive role of 
inhibition deficits was provided when reduced interference or inhibitory control predicted 
dysphoric symptoms and rumination longitudinally over a period of six months in a nonclinical 
student sample (Zetsche & Joormann, 2011). 
 A recent meta-analysis by Yang, Cao, Shields, Teng, and Liu (2016) showed a significant 
negative association between rumination and cognitive inhibition that was not accounted for by 
depressive status or symptomology. Cognitive inhibition deficits may therefore encourage 
depression indirectly by making ruminative responses more likely or perseverative and 
contributing to common symptoms of depression such as anhedonia, mood dysregulation, and 
sustained negative affect (Joormann, Yoon, & Zetsche, 2007). 
Involuntary Memories 
 Diminished executive control in healthy participants was associated with higher numbers 
of intrusive (unwanted and involuntary) thoughts during the White Bear Suppression Task 
(Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), wherein participants are told to consciously suppress thoughts of a 
white bear while verbally expressing their thoughts stream-of-consciousness-style (Brewin & 
Beaton, 2004). These results suggest that proper inhibitory function may play an important role 
in suppressing goal-irrelevant cognitive content that could in turn provoke ruminative responses 
and depressive episodes. Goal-irrelevant cognitive content may include involuntary memories of 
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negative autobiographical events, which are a factor in the maintenance of depressive symptoms 
(Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 1999). As people ruminate more about negative involuntary thoughts 
and memories, they experience more such involuntary cognitive content and have higher levels 
of depression (Smets, Wessel, Schreurs, & Raes, 2012). Watkins (2004) proposed that engaging 
in rumination following a negative event prevents successful emotional processing and thus has 
an impact on the recurrence of the event (via the experience of involuntary memories) and on the 
distress associated with those memories.  
 Converging evidence points to a complex relationship between involuntary memories and 
rumination that lends credence to the possibility of a common etiological source. The 
relationship between the experience of negative involuntary memories and depression may be 
moderated by rumination, as ruminating on such memories may act to amplify their negative 
effects on mood and affect (Williams & Moulds, 2010). Involuntary memories can trigger 
ruminative thinking, and in turn ruminating on a specific involuntary memory can make 
additional involuntary memories more accessible (Newby & Moulds, 2011). There is evidence to 
suggest that rumination may trigger further involuntary memories indirectly by increasing 
negative affect, which makes the recollection of negative involuntary memories more likely 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000). In a study by Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998), 
dysphorics induced to ruminate subsequently recalled more negative involuntary 
autobiographical memories and recalled negative events as happening relatively frequently in 
their lives (and positive events as infrequent) as compared to nondysphoric subjects or 
dysphorics who engaged in the distraction control. Rumination and negative involuntary 
memories can reciprocally influence each other, which may plausibly be attributed to deficient 
cognitive inhibition. Once depressed or dysphoric individuals have begun ruminating, they may 
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have difficulty inhibiting negative involuntary memories, and after experiencing such memories 
spontaneously it may be harder to inhibit ruminative responses. 
Reduced Autobiographical Memory Specificity 
 When prompted to recall a specific autobiographical memory, people with depression and 
other clinical syndromes such as posttraumatic stress disorder and eating disorders often 
demonstrate a robust tendency to recall more general memories than nonclinical populations 
(Dalgleish et al., 2007; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). This tendency, known as reduced 
autobiographical memory specificity (AMS), is clinically significant, as it predicts poorer long-
term outcomes in individuals with major depressive disorder (e.g., Brittlebank et al., 1993; 
Hipwell, Reynolds, & Pitts Crick, 2004). In addition to depression, reduced AMS is also 
associated with higher levels of rumination (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001) and intrusive thoughts 
(Kuyken & Brewin, 1995). Brewin, Reynolds, and Tata (1999) found that reduced AMS was 
associated with greater levels of spontaneous intrusion of stressful memories. Just as rumination 
is highly correlated with depression but a separable entity, participants in a study by Brittlebank 
et al. (1993) who recovered from depression still demonstrated reduced AMS relative to control 
participants, suggesting that reduced AMS may a stable trait and not merely a function of 
depressive symptoms. Mackinger, Loschin, and Leibetseder (2000) compared women who had 
never been depressed with women who had recovered from depression and found relatively 
reduced AMS in the recovered sample, supporting the conclusion made by Brittlebank et al. 
(1993).  
 Williams, Stiles, and Shapiro (1999) argue that to access a specific memory and progress 
beyond the categorical descriptor stage during memory search to a more refined interrogation of 
the specific memory database, one must inhibit unneeded categorical descriptors in some way. 
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Failure to inhibit these descriptors, it is proposed, will lead to the generation of overly general 
responses (reduced AMS) to cue words. Thus, reduced AMS may be explained by difficulties in 
searching the self-memory system that stem from inhibitory failures. Dalgleish et al. (2007) 
provided evidence to suggest that reduced executive control, which includes cognitive inhibition, 
is to a significant extent driving the relationship between depressed mood and reduced AMS 
when they found that a tendency to recall overgeneral memories is negatively associated with 
performance on a variety of measures of executive control independent of current depressed 
mood. 
 It is hypothesized that the dysphoric sample in the present study will demonstrate reduced 
cognitive inhibitory abilities, greater ruminative tendencies, a greater propensity to experience 
negative involuntary memories, and reduced autobiographical memory specificity relative to 
controls. As illustrated in Figure 1, it is further hypothesized that the relationship between 
cognitive inhibition deficits and depressive symptoms will be mediated by rumination, negative 
involuntary memory retrieval, and AMS.  
Method 
Participants 
 The participants in this study were 82 currently enrolled undergraduate psychology 
students at a small, mid-Atlantic liberal arts college (58 females, 24 males, Mage = 19.1, SD = 
1.35). Participants received course credit for their participation, and all provided informed 
consent.  
Materials 
 The computer task was programmed using SuperLab 5.0 and performed on a Dell 
Inspiron 530 desktop computer. Participants made their responses on a RB-830 Response Pad to 
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ensure precision timing. 
Measures 
 CESD-R. 
 Participants were recruited for this study based on their scores on the Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Revised (CESD-R; Eaton, Smith, Ybarra, Muntaner, & 
Tien, 2004) that was taken an average of five weeks prior (M = 5.06, SD = 1.60) to the rest of 
data collection as part of an hour-long battery of self-report measures given to most students in 
introductory psychology classes. The 20 items on the CESD-R ask participants to rate how 
frequently in the past two weeks they have experienced depressive symptoms, both physical 
(e.g., “My appetite was poor”) and emotional (e.g., “I could not shake off the blues”), on a scale 
of 1 (“Not at all or less than 1 day last week”) to 5 (“Nearly every day for two weeks”). The 
CESD-R has been shown to possess high internal consistency, strong factor loadings, and 
theoretically consistent convergent and divergent validity with anxiety, schizotypy, and positive 
and negative affect (Van Dam & Earleywine, 2011). In the present study, the CESD-R again 
demonstrated excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.97). Recruitment of participants 
resulted in two groups: a dysphoric group of participants who scored highly on the CESD-R (n = 
41) with scores equal to or greater than 30 (M = 42.07, SD =10.47), therefore meeting the criteria 
for the probable presence of a depressive episode in the past two weeks (Eaton at al., 2004) and 
dysphoric status, and a control group of participants (n = 41) with scores less than or equal to 3 
(M = 1.42, SD =1.20) who reported almost no depressive symptoms in the past two weeks. 
 RRS. 
 Rumination was assessed via the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS) of the Response 
Styles Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
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Hoeksema, 2003). The RRS is a popular measure of ruminative tendencies (Yang et al., 2016) 
that consists of 22 items that assess the intensity and extent to which individuals engage in 
rumination. Participants rate on a scale from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always) the degree to 
which they endorse each statement as being self-descriptive when experiencing negative affect. 
The items capture various aspects of rumination, including thoughts about symptoms, causes, 
and reactions to negative mood. The RRS shows good test-retest reliability (Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 1994; Bagby, Rector, Bacchiochi, & McBride, 2004) and acceptable convergent and 
predictive validity (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). In the 
current study, the RRS demonstrated excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.94). The 
RRS has also been shown to be relatively stable over the long term (14+ weeks) in depressed 
individuals (Bagby et al., 2004).  
 Treynor et al. (2003) propose that the RRS contains two subscales of five items each, 
reflection and brooding, that capture different subcomponents of rumination. Reflective 
rumination is characterized by an attempt to understand and gain some insight into the nature of 
one’s negative mood (e.g., “Analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed”), 
while brooding rumination consists of a passive consideration of how one’s current situation 
could be better (e.g., “Think, ‘Why do I have problems other people don’t have?’ ”). The two-
dimensional model of the RRS has been demonstrated to possess good reliability and good 
convergent and discriminant validity in nonclinical samples (Schoofs, Hermans, & Raes, 2010). 
Both the reflective (Cronbach’s α = 0.83) and brooding (Cronbach’s α = 0.83) subscales 
possessed good internal consistency in this sample. The other 12 items that comprise the 
composite RRS score are depression-related and therefore, unlike the subscales, are hypothesized 
to be unable to capture aspects of ruminative thinking independent of general depressive 
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symptoms (e.g., “Think about how sad you feel,” or “Think about your feelings of fatigue and 
achiness”). 
 NAP Task. 
 The ability to inhibit irrelevant negative material was assessed by the Negative Affective 
Priming task (NAP task; Daches & Mor, 2015; Joormann, 2006; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011). 
Each trial of the NAP task is comprised of a prime display followed by a probe display, with the 
presentation of a central fixation cross for 1000 ms between each display. Both displays are 
made up of two words, one red and one blue, presented one above the other. On each display, 
participants were instructed to press a key to indicate whether the target word, the red one, was 
“negative” or “neutral” while ignoring the blue distractor word.  
 There were two main types of trials: inhibition and inhibition control. In the prime 
display of inhibition trials, the target word was neutral while the distractor word was negative. In 
the probe display, the target word was a different negative word while the distractor was a 
different neutral word. Thus, in the inhibition trials, the participants had to respond to a negative 
word on the probe display immediately after ignoring a negative word on the prime display (see 
Figure 2 for an example). Inhibition control trials possessed the same probe display (negative 
target and neutral distractor) as the inhibition trials, although the prime display of inhibition 
control trials consisted of a target and distractor that were both neutral words. Thus, in the 
inhibition control trials, participants responded to a negative word on the probe display without 
previously ignoring one on the prime display (refer to Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Sample inhibition and inhibition control trials. The labels on the inhibition trial apply 
exactly to the inhibition control trial as well. While the distractor on the prime display of the 
inhibition trial is negative, the distractor on the prime display of the inhibition control trial is 
neutral. 
 
 The measure of inhibition on the NAP task is the NAP bias score, which is calculated by 
subtracting the response latency on inhibition control probe displays from the response latency 
on inhibition probe displays. If participants are properly inhibiting the negative distractors, a 
small delay will be manifested in responding to inhibition probe displays due to interference 
from the internal representation of the previously inhibited material (Tipper, 1985; Zetsche & 
Joormann, 2011), as they must respond to a negative word immediately after inhibiting one. 
Therefore, higher NAP bias scores represent a greater delay in responding to negative words 
following an attempt to ignore negative words, which has been suggested to indicate a better 
ability to inhibit irrelevant emotional material, since the inhibitory response to negative material 
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on the prime trial carries over to the probe trial (Joormann, 2006). Conversely, lower NAP bias 
scores would denote a relative inhibitory deficit.  
 Filler inhibition and filler inhibition control trials were also presented so that participants 
would not learn to expect negative target words immediately following a negative distractor 
(Daches & Mor, 2015). The prime displays of the filler inhibition and filler inhibition control 
trials were the same as the prime displays of the inhibition and inhibition control trials, 
respectively. The difference came on the probe displays, as both the target and distractor words 
were neutral for both types of filler trials. The NAP task consisted of 96 total trials, made up of 
three blocks that each contained eight trials of each of the four types (inhibition, inhibition 
control, filler inhibition, and filler inhibition control). The 32 trials appeared in a random order 
within each block in addition to a practice block of 16 trials made up of four trials of each type. 
 The negative and neutral words were repeated across blocks but not within them, and the 
words in each block did not differ in length. The location of the target and distractor words at the 
top or bottom of each display was randomized between and within blocks. Participants were 
unaware of the division of trials into prime and probe displays due the identical response 
required for every display and the fixation cross that occurred between every display, not just 
between those connected in a trial. Both the participant’s responses and reaction times on the 
probe displays were recorded.   
 The negative and neutral words used for the NAP task were drawn from the list of nouns 
contained in the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999) that had 
been pre-rated by impartial judges on a scale of 1 (most unpleasant) to 9 (most pleasant) to 
produce a valence score for each word. In the present study nouns were considered negative if 
they had a valence score below 4 (M = 2.37, SD = 0.61), while neutral words had a valence score 
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between 4 and 6 (M = 5.30, SD = 0.38). As expected, negative words had significantly lower 
valence scores (t(126) = -32.08, p < .001) than neutral words. 
 CWAT. 
 The Continuous Word Association Task (CWAT; Ball, 2007; Brewin & Soni, 2011; 
Jones & Steel, 2014) was used as a measure of the frequency of involuntary memory recall. It 
was made up of six trials that each began with the spoken presentation of a cue word by the 
experimenter. The cue words, taken from Brewin and Soni (2011), consisted of three positive 
(thrill, affection, and salary) and three negative cues (misery, emergency, and failure). After 
hearing the cue word, participants were asked to speak aloud the first word or phrase that comes 
to mind. As quickly as possible after providing the first word or phrase, the participants were 
instructed to speak aloud the next word or phrase they thought of associated with the response 
they had just provided, and to continue this pattern until the experimenter asked them to stop. In 
this way, participants created a continuous chain of words or phrases each associated in their 
minds with the previous one. The experimenter ended the trial after the participant had provided 
a random number of associations between 10 and 15. 
 After each trial, the sequence of associations was read aloud to the participant, who was 
instructed to stop the experimenter when an association was reached that had triggered an 
autobiographical memory. The presence of a memory so recalled was recorded, as well as the 
position of the word that had triggered it in the sequence. Participants provided a brief 
description of the recalled memory, which was used to categorize it as specific, defined as 
memories of events that occurred at a particular place and time and lasted less than a day, or 
general, which includes nonspecific memories that extend over time as well as general categories 
of similar events. They also gave a rating of how important the memory is to their self-identity 
EXECUTIVE CONTROL IN DYSPHORIA! 16 
(on a scale of 0 to 10) to indicate the personal importance of the memory and a rating of the 
emotional content of the memory on a scale from -3 (very negative) to 3 (very positive). 
Memories triggered earlier in the sequence indicate a relatively increased propensity to 
experience involuntary, goal-irrelevant memories in response to emotionally induced semantic 
cue categories (see Figure 3 for examples of CWAT responses). 
 
 
Affection: dogs – golden retriever – family – parents – holidays – Thanksgiving – aunt and 
uncle's house – New Jersey – beach – ocean – sun – warmth – summer – no school – vacations   
 
Memory: “I thought of going to my aunt and uncle’s house every Thanksgiving.” 
 
Misery:   sadness –  dark – desolate – cave – dirt – socks – geology – class – work – paper – due 
– action – verb  
 
Memory: “I thought about getting bad grades.” 
 
Emergency: 911 – EpiPen – peanuts – not breathing – hives – brother – cookies – high school – 
wrestling – friends – Christmas – St. Christopher’s – porch – swing – fall  
 
Memory: “When I found out my brother was in the hospital.”  
 
Thrill: excitement – roller coaster – friends – Christmas – dinner – bars – Uber – car – leather – 
jacket – cold – snow – winter – skiing  
 
Memory: “I thought of going home at the beginning of last winter break.” 
 
 
Figure 3. Sample CWAT associations with involuntary memories. The cue word is in bold, and 
every association is separated by a dash. The circled word or phrase is the one that triggered the 
memory. The first two examples demonstrate general memories, while the latter two examples 
show specific memories. 
 
 AMT. 
 The Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) was used as 
the primary measure of reduced AMS (autobiographical memory specificity). In each of the 
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AMT’s 10 trials, participants were presented with a cue word and asked to recall and briefly 
describe aloud a specific memory, defined using the same criteria as specific memories in the 
CWAT above. After two practice trials, participants were presented with each of the 10 cue 
words drawn from Williams and Broadbent’s (1986) original study consisting of five negative 
words (hurt, clumsy, sorry, angry, and lonely) and five positive words (interested, happy, 
successful, safe, and surprised) in a random order. The measure of reduced AMS was the 
proportion of specific memories recalled, with a lower proportion indicating a relatively reduced 
ability to recall specific autobiographical memories. Failure to recall a memory within 30 
seconds was coded as an omission but only occurred on 2% of trials. The participants’ 
descriptions of the recalled memory were used by the experimenter to encode the specificity of 
the memory (see Figure 4 for sample AMT responses). Two experimenters ran participants 
separately and demonstrated high inter-rater reliability in coding the memories for specificity 
(agreement on a random sample of memories (n = 140) was 99.3%, κ = 0.97). 
 
 
 
Happy: “I feel happy whenever I am with my roommate.” 
 
Hurt: “I had a kitten when I was younger who always used to bite me.” 
 
Clumsy: “I woke up in the middle of the night and knocked my phone off the bed, shattering the 
screen.” 
 
Safe: “I felt safe being with my friend last night.” 
 
 
Figure 4. Sample AMT memories. The cue word is in bold. The first two memories are general, 
while the latter two memories are specific. 
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Procedure 
 Upon entering the room, participants signed an informed consent form. Next, they were 
taken to a smaller adjoining room where they sat approximately two feet in front of a desk with a 
computer on it while the experimenter sat roughly three feet to the participants’ right. The 
participants then completed both the CWAT and the AMT.  The order of these two memory 
tasks was counterbalanced to test for an effect of memory task order on the specificity of 
participant’s memories. After completing the CWAT and the AMT, participants completed the 
NAP task. Following the NAP task, participants were moved back into the larger testing room to 
complete the RRS questionnaire by hand. Finally, participants were debriefed and given contact 
information for the college counseling center and other local mental health services.  
Results  
Rumination 
 One participant omitted an item on the brooding rumination subscale, so while 82 
participant responses were used for the reflective rumination subscale, only 81 participant 
responses were used for the composite rumination score (as measured by the total score on the 
RRS) and the brooding rumination subscale. 
 As expected, the dysphoric group showed significantly higher scores on all rumination 
measures (!! = 57.78, !"! = 10.39; !! = 12.02, !"! = 3.73; !! = 12.35, !"! = 3.68) than the 
control group (!! = 36.27, !"! = 12.25; !!(79) = 8.51, p <.001; !! = 8.24, !"! = 3.75; !!(80) 
= 4.57, p <.001; !! = 8.76, !"! = 3.56; !!(79) = 4.47, p <.001). Please refer to Table 1 for an 
overview of group differences on the experimental and self-report measures.  
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Table 1. Group Differences on Self-Report and Experimental Measures 
 
     Dysphoric Group (n = 41)            Control Group (n = 41)            
     M   SD     M        SD               t                  p 
 
CESD-R                             
RRS  
  Reflection Subscale  
  Brooding Subscale           
NAP Bias                           
CWAT 
  Total Memories               
  Memory Position             
  Memory Specificity                                
AMT 
  Memory Specificity
              
CESD-R = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Revised; RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale; NAP 
= Negative Affective Priming; CWAT = Continuous Word Association Task; AMT = Autobiographical Memory 
Test 
 
NAP Task 
 Only the probe trials of the NAP task were analyzed. Trials were not used if the response 
was incorrect or if the reaction time for the trial was less than 250 ms or greater than 3000 ms. In 
addition, eight participants were removed from the NAP data analysis for having an overall error 
rate on inhibition probe trials exceeding 25%, leaving 74 participants’ responses on the NAP task 
for data analysis. 
 Contrary to expectations, the dysphoric group demonstrated a significantly higher NAP 
bias score (M = 44.87, SD = 92.37) than the control group (M = -6.11, SD = 115.60; t(73) = 2.08, 
p <.05). This unexpected result was nevertheless consistent with the strong association between 
depression and rumination, as there were positive correlations between NAP bias scores and 
scores on the CESD-R (r(74) = .26, p <.05), composite rumination (r(73) = .30, p = .01), and 
brooding rumination (r(73) =.33, p <.01), and a smaller correlation between NAP bias scores and 
reflective rumination that was nonsignificant but approaching significance (r(74) = .20, p =.08). 
42.07    10.47                          1.42      1.20                24.69        <.001 
57.78    10.39                          36.27    12.25              8.51          <.001 
12.02    3.73                            8.24       3.75               4.57          <.001 
12.35    3.68                            8.76       3.56               4.47          <.001  
44.87    92.37                         -6.11     115.60             2.08          <.05 
                
5.68      0.61                    5.46       0.92               1.27            ns 
5.56      1.67   5.19       1.92               0.94            ns  
0.53      0.24                            0.59       0.23               1.10            ns 
  
0.83      0.17    0.85       0.13  0.77            ns 
  
EXECUTIVE CONTROL IN DYSPHORIA! 20 
The NAP bias effect was successfully elicited, but not in the direction predicted based on 
previous research. 
 A simple linear regression analysis indicated that NAP bias scores were a significant 
predictor of CESD-R scores (b = .05, t(73) = 2.26, p <.05), composite rumination (!! = .04, !!(73) = 2.64, p =.01) and brooding rumination (!! = .01, !!(73) = 2.99, p <.01) but not 
reflective rumination (!! = .01, !!(73) = 1.76, p =.08). NAP bias scores ceased to predict CESD-
R scores when any form of rumination was taken into account in a multiple linear regression 
analysis (!! = .01, !!(73) = 0.63, p >.05; !! = .02, !!(73) = 1.02, p >.05; !!! = .03, !!(73) = 1.60, 
p >.05), which supports the view that rumination mediates the link between executive 
dysfunction and dysphoria. Sobel tests for mediation (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) were significant 
with composite rumination (z = 2.45, p <.05) and brooding rumination (z = 2.52, p <.05) but not 
reflective rumination (z = 1.50, p >.05) as the mediator between NAP bias scores and CESD-R 
scores, formally establishing the mediating role of composite rumination and brooding 
rumination. 
CWAT 
 There were no significant effects of order (all ps >.05) when the CWAT was taken before 
or after the AMT, so order of the memory tests was not included in further analysis. The CWAT 
was successful in eliciting involuntary memories on 93% of trials. However, there was no 
significant difference in the total number of trials when involuntary memories were recalled 
between the dysphoric group (M  = 5.68, SD = 0.61) and control group (M  = 5.46, SD = 0.92; 
t(80) = 1.27, p >.05). There was also no significant difference in the number of word associations 
made during the CWAT before an involuntary memory was elicited when comparing the 
dysphoric group (M = 5.56, SD = 1.67) and control group (M = 5.19, SD = 1.92; t(80) = 0.94, p 
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>.05) (refer to Table 1). Somewhat surprisingly, there was no significant effect of cue valence on 
performance between groups (see Table 2 for a summary). 
 
Table 2. Group Differences on the CWAT and AMT by Cue Valence 
 
                 Dysphoric Group (n = 41)      Control Group (n = 41)            
        Cue Type   M   SD           M        SD               t                  p 
 
CWAT  
  Total Memories           Pos            
          Neg           
  Memory Position         Pos            
          Neg            
  Memory Specificity     Pos            
          Neg            
AMT  
  Memory Specificity     Pos           
          Neg           
 
CWAT = Continuous Word Association Task; AMT = Autobiographical Memory Test 
 
 
 
 There were some notable differences in the characteristics of the involuntary memories 
recalled. The dysphoric group reported memories that were significantly more negative on 
positive cue trials (M = 0.92; SD = 0.99) than the control group (M = 1.50; SD = 1.21; t(80) = 
2.36, p < .05) as well as significantly more personally important memories on negative cue trials 
(M = 4.90; SD = 2.01) than the control group (M = 3.98; SD = 1.80; t(80) = 2.18, p < .05).  
 AMS (defined as the proportion of specific memories recalled) on the CWAT was 
significantly correlated with AMS as measured by the AMT (r(82) = .22, p <.05). Thus, a 
correlation was found between the specificity of involuntary memories and the specificity of 
consciously recalled memories. However, there was no significant difference in AMS as 
measured by the CWAT between the dysphoric group (M = 0.53, SD = 0.24) and the control 
2.88      0.33                    2.68     0.61             1.80            ns 
2.80      0.46                    2.78     0.52             0.22            ns   
5.85      2.08                    5.09     2.14             1.61            ns   
5.17      2.24                    5.26     2.82             0.15            ns  
0.52      0.33                    0.57     0.31             0.64            ns   
0.54      0.35                    0.60     0.33             0.83            ns  
 
0.83      0.20                    0.87     0.17             0.85            ns   
0.82      0.21                    0.84     0.16             0.45            ns   
          
EXECUTIVE CONTROL IN DYSPHORIA! 22 
group (M  = 0.59, SD = 0.23; t(80) = 1.10, p >.05). A mediation analysis was not conducted with 
any of the CWAT measures because there were no differences in memory retrieval between the 
dysphoric and control groups. 
AMT 
 There was no significant difference in AMS as measured by the AMT between the 
dysphoric group (M = 0.83, SD = 0.17) and the control group (M = 0.85, SD = 0.13; t(80) = 0.77, 
p >.05). There was also no significant correlation between NAP bias scores and AMS (r(74) = -
.09, p >.05). Thus, no evidence for reduced AMS was found in the current dysphoric sample, and 
so no mediation analysis involving AMS was conducted. 
Discussion 
 The first goal of the present study was to replicate in a dysphoric sample several 
cognitive characteristics frequently associated with depression: deficient cognitive inhibition, 
increased ruminative tendencies, abnormalities in the characteristics and elicitation of 
involuntary memories, and reduced AMS (autobiographical memory specificity). The second 
goal was to test for evidence that these cognitive characteristics may mediate the relationship 
between executive control deficits and dysphoria. Perhaps the most surprising result was that 
participants scoring highly on measures of depressive symptomology possessed higher NAP bias 
scores, indicating that they took longer to respond to negative words immediately after ignoring 
one than control controls. Some recent interpretations of the NAP task would expect the results 
to be reversed; since dysphoric individuals are unable to successfully inhibit the negative 
distractor on the prime display, they should not show a delay in responding to a negative target 
presented immediately afterwards (Zetsche & Joormann, 2011). Rather, NAP bias scores should 
be higher for the healthy controls that can successfully inhibit the negative distractor, thereby 
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producing an interference effect that accounts for the response latency on inhibition trials relative 
to inhibition control trials. 
 It seems unlikely that healthy controls are relatively less able to inhibit negative 
emotional material, as the current results might suggest according to Joormann’s (2006) theory. 
However, there are three possible alternative explanations for my results. The first is that the 
NAP task is not merely measuring cognitive inhibition. Executive control is viewed by many 
researchers to consist of three executive functions: inhibition, the monitoring and updating of 
working memory, and mental set shifting (De Lissnyder, Koster, Derakshan & De Raedt, 2010; 
Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000). While cognitive inhibition is the 
ability to inhibit the processing of irrelevant and distracting material, set shifting refers to the 
ability to switch between different tasks and mental sets and alter behavior accordingly (Monsell, 
1996). Set shifting impairments have been observed in dysphoric and depressed individuals 
(Harvey et al., 2004; Merriam, Thase, Haas, Keshavan, & Sweeney, 1999; Rogers et al., 2004) 
and in high ruminators (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; De Lissnyder et al., 2010). Similar to 
rumination, set shifting has been suggested to be a stable vulnerability factor for depression, as 
impairments have been found in previously depressed individuals (Paelecke-Habermann, Pohl, & 
Leplow, 2005). 
 The inhibition trials of the NAP task require the participant to immediately shift from 
ignoring a negative distractor to responding to a negative target word, which may be an index of 
set shifting ability. If the NAP task more accurately measures set shifting ability, then one would 
expect the dysphoric groups to have relatively higher NAP bias scores, indicating a reduced 
ability to quickly shift from ignoring a negative word to responding to one that manifests as a 
response latency on the inhibition trials (Monsell, 2003). Indeed, the current results support such 
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an interpretation. Although there is also set shifting involved on the inhibition control trials as 
the participant switches from ignoring a neutral word to focusing on a negative word, one would 
expect the set shifting cost (as manifested in a response latency) to be greater when shifting 
between different modes of relating to negative stimuli, as some studies suggest that depressed 
individuals show the largest impairment on set shifting when stimuli are negatively valenced 
(Murphy et al., 1999; Deveney & Deldin, 2006).  
 The second possible explanation for the unexpected results is that the negative priming 
paradigm is able to assess cognitive inhibition, and a reduced inhibitory ability should be 
manifested as a higher NAP bias score rather than a lower one, contrary to Joormann’s 
hypothesis (see Joormann, 2006; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011). In his original negative priming 
research, Tipper (1985) argued that negative priming, manifested as a response latency, will only 
occur if the ignored cue on the prime trial is sufficiently attended to—otherwise, there will be no 
internal representation of the cue to cause interference on the following probe trial. Perhaps the 
dysphoric group demonstrated a negative priming effect because they were relatively more 
attentive to the negative distractor words on the inhibition prime trials than the control group 
was. If this is the case, then dysphorics demonstrated a response latency due to a reduced ability 
to inhibit processing of the negative distractor words, and one would expect higher NAP bias 
scores to actually represent unsuccessful inhibition, because the participant is less able to 
suppress processing of the distractor word and thus possesses a more salient internal 
representation to interfere with responding on the probe trial. Future research should examine the 
NAP task to determine exactly which function of executive control it measures and the 
mechanisms by which it does so. 
 The third possible explanation is that dysphoric participants might demonstrate different 
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response patterns on the NAP task than clinically depressed participants. If executive control 
impairments contribute to depressive symptoms, then it would be reasonable to expect a 
dysphoric group to have smaller inhibitory impairments than a clinically depressed group relative 
to controls. However, it seems more plausible that a dysphoric group would demonstrate a 
weaker but still similar trend to a clinically depressed group rather than a trend in the completely 
opposite direction. The selection of participants for the current study ensured that the dysphoric 
group, while lacking in clinical diagnosis, nevertheless reported levels of depressive symptoms 
that qualified as indicating a probable depressive episode in the past two weeks, which suggests 
that the dysphoric group was more similar than not to a clinically depressed group. 
 In addition to differences in executive control between the dysphoric and control groups, 
the current study also succeeded in eliciting differences between the groups in ruminative 
tendencies, with the dysphoric group scoring higher on the RRS and both the brooding and 
reflective rumination subscales (refer to Table 1). Executive control deficits have been associated 
with both the brooding and reflective rumination subscales (Whitmer & Banich, 2007; Zetsche, 
D'Avanzato, & Joormann, 2012), although brooding rumination has been especially linked to 
impaired inhibition of negative information (Daches & Mor, 2015; De Lissnyder et al., 2010). It 
is not surprising, then, that both rumination as a whole and brooding rumination, but not 
reflective rumination, mediated the relationship between executive control as measured by NAP 
bias scores and depressive symptomology. This is important clinically because, of the two 
rumination subscales, brooding is relatively more maladaptive (Schoofs et al., 2010). The current 
results suggest that it may be fruitful in the treatment of depression or dysphoria to attempt to 
reduce brooding rumination indirectly by bolstering executive control.  
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 No difference was found in the total number of trials in which involuntary memories 
were recalled on the CWAT by dysphoric status, nor was there a difference in the propensity to 
recall involuntary memories as measured by the number of associations made on the CWAT 
before a memory was recalled between dysphoric and control participants. Future studies should 
include neutral cue words on the CWAT, as dysphorics and nondysphoric controls may differ in 
aspects of involuntary memory retrieval in response to non-emotional stimuli, especially if 
dysphorics may be more inclined to negatively interpret neutral stimuli. Some differences were 
found in the characteristics of memories, as the dysphoric group recalled memories that were 
more negative in response to positive cue words and more personally important memories in 
response to negative cue words. As such, although there were limited differences found in this 
study (refer to Table 2), the effects of cue valence on memory recall in dysphoria or depression 
may yet warrant further study. Furthermore, there was no indication of differences in AMS in 
either voluntary or involuntary memories between groups. Although reduced AMS has been 
posited to be a stable trait independent of current depressive status (Brittlebank et al., 1993; 
Mackinger, Loschin, & Leibetseder, 2000), it may nevertheless be more characteristic of 
depression than of dysphoria, or subclinical depression.  
 Although the current study successfully found reduced executive control and increased 
ruminative tendencies in dysphoric participants and provided evidence supporting the theory that 
one of the ways diminished executive functioning increases depressive symptomology is 
indirectly by encouraging rumination (see Figure 5), no differences were found between the 
dysphoric and control groups in the accessibility of involuntary memories or AMS. It is possible 
that differences in memory recall and characteristics may be observed at clinical levels of 
depression, but without replicating these effects in a dysphoric sample no comment can be made 
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on their possible mediating role between reduced executive function and depressive 
symptomology. Replication of the current study with a clinically depressed population would 
possibly give a clearer picture of the relationship between executive control, the autobiographical 
memory system, and depressive symptomology.  
 
     
Figure 5. Supported mediation pathway. The results showed that rumination mediated the 
relationship between executive control dysfunction and depressive symptoms. 
 
 
 
 The NAP task did not attempt to examine the inhibition of neutral or positive stimuli, so 
it is possible that the results do not represent an executive control deficit exclusively in relation 
to negative material but could also represent a general executive control deficit or a deficit in 
handling emotional material, regardless of valence. The unexpected results of the NAP task 
warrant further scrutiny into the nature of the task, although it seems to measure some form of 
executive control. 
 It is worth noting that the supported mediation pathway does not preclude other forms of 
relationships between these phenomena in dysphoria or depression. It seems less plausible that 
dysphoria might also contribute to reduced executive control indirectly by encouraging 
rumination, reduced AMS, and the experience of negative involuntary memories, but that 
pathway was not tested in the current study. However, depressed mood could plausibly increase 
the likelihood of engaging in rumination, experiencing negative involuntary memories, and 
Executive 
Control  
Dysfunction 
Rumination Dysphoria 
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recalling less specific memories. The reciprocal relationship between rumination and involuntary 
memories (Newby & Moulds, 2011; Williams & Moulds, 2010) is just one example of how 
potential mediators of the relationship between executive control and depressive symptoms could 
also influence each other. 
 In sum, the current study found reduced executive control and higher levels of rumination 
in dysphorics compared to controls, but no evidence for differences in involuntary memory 
retrieval or accessibility or in autobiographical memory specificity. The results support the 
theory that the relationship between executive control deficits and depressive symptoms are 
mediated by an increase in ruminative tendencies, especially the tendency to engage in brooding 
rumination.  
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